Election 2024: Trump and National Security - Dr. Mackubin Owens
Mackubin Owens, MINDSETTER™
Election 2024: Trump and National Security - Dr. Mackubin Owens
From the end of World War II to the beginning of the Obama Administration, the United States, like Britain before it, pursued a realist grand strategy of primacy in an effort to sustain a liberal world order. It ensured access to the “global commons”—especially freedom of navigation, which is essential to the prosperity arising from free trade and commerce—and airspace. It deterred the behavior of potential aggressors in the international system. It was willing to confront aggressors in the “contested zone,” the littorals of Eurasia.
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But unlike his predecessors from both parties since World War II, President Obama chose to pursue an approach to international relations that relegated the United States to the status of just “one among many.” He firmly rejected the idea of American exceptionalism and the status of the United States as the “indispensable nation” providing the “public good” of security. He made a conscious decision to dial back American power based on the expectation that others—international institutions, allies, and the rule-based international order itself—would step forward to maintain peace and security. Of course, they did not do so and our enemies exploited the situation.
This radical and dangerous shift created a more turbulent world and an increased likelihood of war by miscalculation in the future. China became more aggressive; Russia threatened the peace of Europe. By acting on the claim that he was elected to end wars, not to start them—as if wars were ends in themselves, not means—President Obama aided and abetted the rise of ISIS after his decision to withdraw completely from Iraq. And his nuclear agreement with Iran made a mockery of the decades-long U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. More importantly, the agreement was just another example of what appeared to many observers to be President Obama’s campaign to cede the Middle East to Iran. Following the Trump interregnum, the Biden administration doubled down on these policies, indeed making them worse with its bungled withdrawal from Afghanistan.
If he is elected president in November, what sort of foreign policy can we expect from a second Trump administration? The 2016 candidacy and subsequent election of Donald Trump to the presidency caused a great deal of consternation among the U.S. foreign policy establishment, Democrat and Republican alike. His campaign rhetoric suggested that he had no coherent view of U.S. foreign policy, other than the gauzy commitment to “making America great again” and “America first.”
Trump criticized America’s overseas commitments, including the ongoing effort in Afghanistan; called into question the value of NATO; and argued the United States was being undone by its adherence to free trade. On the other hand, his bombastic language suggested he was ready to abandon the constraints on the use of force that traditionally have guided our military efforts. His inflammatory campaign rhetoric led many conservative foreign policy specialists--myself included--to criticize him.
But in practice, Trump’s national-security strategy was far more coherent and beneficial to the United States than the global retreat embraced by the both the Obama and Biden administrations. If he is elected in November, I believe that his foreign policy will resemble that of his first administration, which is not a bad thing.
Trump outlined his foreign policy in his 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), which was based on four “pillars:” 1) protecting the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; 2) promoting American prosperity; 3) preserving peace through strength; and 4) advancing American influence. The most important features of his foreign policy were these:
First, its call for a healthy nationalism. This nationalism was not the nationalism caricatured by Trump’s critics; it was not a reflection of racism and disdain for foreigners. It was neither ethnic nor racial nationalism but civic nationalism, better described as patriotism. Throughout his presidency, Trump’s central belief was that the purpose of American power was to advance the interests of American citizens.
Second, a corollary of the first, its “state-centric” view of international politics, one that approaches international institutions and “global governance” with great skepticism. It is in the interest of the United States to advance U.S. political, military, and economic strength, not to impose America's will on others but to “secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.”
By extension, Trump’s NSS rejected the contention that the United States should cede sovereignty to international institutions in order to be embraced by the mythical “international community.” Of course, the United States should support international institutions to the extent that they advance U.S. interests. Indeed, the United States led the way in creating the institutions of the post-World War II liberal order, most notably the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, and trade agreements, subsequently employing its power to underwrite them. The choice to do so was not motivated by altruism but by the recognition that the freedom, security, and prosperity of the United States are best secured in a world where other states are also secure, free and prosperous.
Although it is in the interest of the United States to cooperate with others within this international system, such cooperation depends on reciprocity. This has been especially important in the areas of trade and alliances. In principle, free trade is good for countries in the international system. Trump contended that for too long, the United States had pursued trade agreements that were not in US interests. The principle of reciprocity was necessary to redress this imbalance.
Third, its recognition of the role of armed diplomacy. American policymakers have long treated force and diplomacy as an either-or proposition. But understood properly, force and diplomacy are two sides of the same coin. The threat of force increases the leverage of diplomats. The Trump administration’s approach to Iran, North Korea, and Russia were cases in point.
Fourth, its prioritization of economic growth and leveraging the new geopolitics of energy. The Trump administration moved expeditiously to lift regulations that hampered U.S. domestic productivity across the board, but especially in the area of energy production. While domestic oil and gas production had increased as a result of the revolution associated with hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and directional drilling, it did so despite the priorities of the Obama administration, which wished to decrease reliance on hydrocarbons. Trump made it clear he wished to exploit America’s energy potential to take advantage of the new geopolitics of energy.
Finally, its defense of liberal principles. Of course, although the United States is safer and more prosperous in a world populated by other democratic republics, prudence dictates that the United States attempt to spread its principles only when it can do so in a cost-effective manner.
Trump’s NSS was roundly criticized by advocates of “cooperative security.” The problem with cooperative security is that it requires states in the international system to subordinate their interests to a fictional “international community” and act in accordance with a system that operates independently of national interest. Cooperative security also wrongly assumes that international participation is sufficient to sustain the liberal world order. It is not. It must be supported by a dominant power and influence.
The Obama and Biden administrations have made a fetish of international organizations and alliances, both of which are means, not ends. In fact, the goal or purpose of American power should always be to secure the American Republic, protect its liberty, and facilitate the prosperity of its people. The United States does not wield its power for some “global good,” independent of US national interests. Trump’s election in 2016 was due in part to the perception that U.S. power was not being used to advance the interests of Americans but in the service of others, i.e., the “international community,” international institutions, or the like.
Of course, we come to the question that anyone who defends Trump must answer: “well, what about Russia?” We all know the narrative. Trump “colluded” with Russia to win the presidency in 2016. At best, Trump is Putin’s “Manchurian Candidate.” At worst, he is guilty of “treason.” Of course, evidence of Russian collusion remains elusive, despite a long and expensive investigation. And the charge of treason is ridiculous.
If Trump were somehow beholden to Putin in such a way as to subvert US interests to those of Russia, we would expect to see US policy that strengthens Russia. So where is it? Where is the quid pro quo in policy that one would expect if Trump were Putin’s puppet? In saner times, the response to the claim that Trump was in Putin’s pocket would be Cui bono? During Trump’s term, did US policy help or hurt Russia? Let us count the ways.
During Trump’s presidency, the United States: increased defense spending; pulled out of the dreadful Iran deal; armed the Ukrainian opposition to Putin; bombed Syrian chemical-weapons sites; constructed ballistic missile defense (BMD) sites in Poland; demanded that NATO spend more on defense; killed Russian mercenaries in Syria, and expanded sanctions against Russia and especially Putin’s inner circles; enforced penalties against U.S. and foreign companies that violated those sanctions; and expelled Russian diplomats.
Most importantly, from a geopolitical standpoint, he unleashed American energy production, which hurt the Russian economy. These steps are all much tougher and impose much more cost on Russia than anything Obama did, or Hillary Clinton might have done.
But there is another issue here. Russia is a declining power, especially in demographic and economic terms. Putin may be playing a weak hand well, but it is still a weak hand. Russia’s weakness opens up the possibility of a US-Russian alignment against the real threat to America’s position in the world: China. To paraphrase the 19th century British prime minister, Lord Palmerston, “the United States has no eternal friends, the United States has no perpetual enemies, the United States has only eternal and perpetual interests.” Trump’s approach to Russia was part of a necessary restructuring of America’s relationship with the rest of the world.
I would expect a Trump second term foreign policy to reject the Obama-Biden approach of subordinating US interests to other parties. Instead, it would seek to ensure the freedom, security, and prosperity of the United States by enhancing American power, influence, and credibility.